I recently had someone respond to my claim that there is no objective free will with the following.
If we can truly assess our beliefs then we are not determined after all. If we are determined then we have no epistemic justification for believing our beliefs to be true. I’m not sure if you are really grasping the epistemological implications of determinism.
Let’s examine these statements.
If we can truly assess out belief, then we are not determined at all…unless our tools of assessment have been determined. They have been. There is no component of assessment that has not been shown to have a neurological correlate.
The fact that a causal chain turns back in on itself is unremarkable. This happens with tornadoes, economies, and psychological development, none of which requires that we introduce a “supernatural” cause. And if the intricacies of the material mechanism have not been teased out, we are not warranted in plugging a “supernatural” placeholder into these variables. We patiently wait with the warranted expectation that the cause is fully material; warranted due to the long history of successful material explanations and the utter failure of all proposed supernatural placeholders.